Abstract-Information flow analysis is a powerful technique for reasoning about the sensitive information exposed by a program during its execution. While past work has proposed information theoretic metrics (e.g., Shannon entropy, min-entropy, guessing entropy, etc.) to quantify such information leakage, we argue that some of these measures not only result in counter-intuitive measures of leakage, but also are inherently prone to conflicts when comparing two programs P 1 and P2 − say Shannon entropy predicts higher leakage for program P 1, while guessing entropy predicts higher leakage for program P 2. This paper presents the first attempt towards addressing such conflicts and derives solutions for conflict-free comparison of finite order deterministic programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensitive and confidential data protection grows to hot and important in many different fields, such as electronic commerce, auctions, voting, and so on. In this area, information flow analysis is a powerful technique for reasoning about how much sensitive information is exposed by a program during execution [1] [2] [3] . Existing approaches to information flow analysis can be broadly classified into two: qualitative and quantitative approach. Qualitative information flow analysis, such as taint tracking [4, 5] , are coarse-grained − often only distinguishing between possible leakage and no leakage.
Recently, quantitative information analysis [1, [6] [7] [8] techniques have been proposed to alleviate this problem by offering a more fine-grained quantitative assessment of information leakage. Such techniques adopt information theoretic metrics [9, 10] such as mutual information between the secret/sensitive input to a program and its public output to quantify information leakage, as shown in Figure I . In doing so, several entropy measures have been used to assess mutual information, including, Shannon entropy, Renyi entropy, Guessing entropy (see [6, 7, 11] for more details), and so on. However, in most past work, the choice of such entropy measure has been ad hoc (mostly driven by sample programs) − sometimes leading to counter-intuitive results. Consider the following two programs (by Smith [7] ), where the secret input A is uniformly distributed 8k-bit integer with k ≥ 2, & denotes bitwise and and 0 7k−1 1 k+1 denotes a binary constant. Intuitively, one might argue that PROG P1 has much higher information leakage than PROG P2 when k is large, because it reveals complete information about the secret input with probability 1 8 ; on the other hand, when k is large, PROG P2 reveals roughly 1 8 of the number of bits in A. However, applying Shannon entropy measure and computing the mutual information I 1 between A and O yields a counter intuitive result:
PROG P1 if
, leakage by PROG P1 is smaller than leakage by PROG P2, which violates popular consensus in information leakage literature [6, 7] . Indeed, from a security standpoint, PROG P1 leaves A highly vulnerable to being guessed (e.g., when it is a multiple of 8), while PROG P2 does not (at least for large k).
In this paper we argue that past work has failed to address which entropy measure(s) is best suited for quantifying information leakage. Further, this paper shows that some of these entropy based measures (proposed by past work) may be conflicting when they are applied to two programs P 1 and P 2 , i.e., entropy measure H predicts higher leakage for program P 1 , while entropy measure H predicts higher leakage for program P 2 . This paper (to the best of our knowledge) presents the first attempt to analyze different information leakage metrics, show the existence of conflicts in measures proposed by past work and propose a new method for comparing information leakage in finite order deterministic programs.
Outline. The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we present a model for finite order deterministic programs. Section III shows the existence of conflicts between leakage measures proposed by past work, followed by our conflict-free leakage metric in Section IV.
We analyze a few sample programs using our leakage measure in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. MODEL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present a formal model for a singleinput single-output (SISO) deterministic program and Renyi-entropy based definition of information leakage. A SISO deterministic program is modeled as a group of onto mappings: Unless explicitly specified, in the following portions of this paper, we assume that the secret input A has an uniform prior distribution in A for any |A|.
A key difference between FOPs and IOPs is that the entropy of output O is bounded for FOPs, and so is information leakage. Under most conditions, when |O| is fixed (independent of |A|), the security level of a FOP may increase as |A| increases. In the following portions of this paper we focus on information leakage metrics for FOPs.
Having formalized the program model, we define leakage using Renyi entropy [12] , which covers most of the entropy metrics adopted by past work on information flow analysis [6, 7, 11, 13] , such as Shannon entropy, min-entropy, vulnerability one-guess entropy (proposed by Hamadou et. al, [6] ), etc. Renyi entropy is defined as follows: For a random variable X with distribution p = (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p n ), its Renyi entropy is defined as:
where α is a parameter. In this paper we also apply
denotes the vulnerability one-guess entropy.
According to general consensus in information flow analysis literate, information leakage (IL) of a program C = (q |A| , |A|, F |A| , p |A| ) (at a given |A|) under α-Renyi entropy metric is defined as the mutual information I α between O and A:
where IL α (C, |A|) denotes a class of information leakage metrics (for different values of α) of program C. Note that since the program is deterministic H α (O|A) = 0, ∀α.
It is worth noting that the mutual information I α (O, A) may also be defined as
This alternative definition is not considered here because when A is uniformly distributed,
In the next section, we show that this definition of information leakage results in conflicts when comparing two programs. In the subsequent sections we develop solutions for conflict-free comparison of two programs.
III. CONFLICTS IN INFORMATION LEAKAGE METRICS
In this section we show several examples of conflicts while comparing two program's information leakage. Recall PROG P1 and PROG P2 from Section I. Consider the Renyi mutual information of these two PROGs when
Note that only the comparing IL 0 (P 1, 2 8k ) and IL 0 (P 2, 2 8k ) agrees with our intuition that P1 leaks much more information than P2; however, comparing IL 1 (P 1, 2 8k ) and IL 1 (P 2, 2 8k ) shows that P1 leaks about the same amount of information as P2; comparing IL ∞ (P 1, 2 8k ) and IL ∞ (P 2, 2 8k ) shows that P2 leaks much more information than P1. We see that the leakage measures for different α values conflict with each other, and some of them are even counter-intuitive.
Smith [7] and Hamadou et. al. [6] argue that IL 0 is more important than IL 1 in information flow analysis, because in the above example, IL 0 coincides with the intuition but IL 1 does not. However, it is not difficult to come up with other examples where IL 1 coincides with the intuition but IL 0 does not. Consider the following two programs, where the high input A is an uniformly distributed k-bit integer with k ≥ 2 and L is a parameter in A.
The intuition is that PROG P4 leaks much more information than PROG P3, because when k is large, the probability of A = L becomes so low that PROG P3 leaks almost no information. But PROG P4 always leaks 1 bit of information, irrespective of |A|. Now, consider the Renyi mutual information when α = 0, 1, ∞:
We see that the comparing result when α = 0 fails to coincide with the intuition, while the comparing results when α = 1 or ∞ match the intuition. The conflict between information leakage metrics for different values of α appears again.
The following lemma indicates that the conflict between different metrics is very common. 
Proof: The key idea to construct the programs stem from the following property of Renyi entropy H α (p): if p is uniform, H α (p) is a constant (independent of α); if p contains a peak probability and a large number of small probabilities, H α (p) will decrease quickly as α increases.
First, let us suppose 1 < α < β ≤ ∞. Pick values p 0 ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N + such that
We note that one can first pick p 0 satisfying (3); then, to satisfy (4) and (5) one simply needs to choose a sufficiently large value for n. Specify the mapping function F |A| for C 1 so that the distribution of O is p |A| = (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p n ) with p 0 chosen as described above and p 1 = ... = p n = 1−p0 n for any |A| > n + 1, and specify the mapping function F |A| for C 2 so that the distribution of O is p |A| = (1/2, 1/2) for any |A|. Then, for any |A| > n + 1, equations (1) and (2) are satisfied.
The construction of C 1 and C 2 when 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1 is similar. Due to space limitations we omit the proofs here. Interested readers can check our technical report in ArXiv for details [14] .
IV. QUANTIFYING INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN FOPS
So far we have shown that some measures of information leakage are not only counter-intuitive, but also introduce conflicts when comparing two programs. In this section we develop a new approach to quantify and compare information leakage in programs. We first sketch the key idea behind our approach. Recall that in FOPs, |A| acts as a security parameter for the program − intuitively, increasing |A| may increase the security level of the program (since, |O| is finite and constant − independent of |A|). Recall the password checker PROG P3 − observe that increasing the length of the password (A) by one bit doubles the security level of the program.
In this paper we propose that two FOPs C 1 and C 2 should be compared by examining |A|) . In particular, we show that one can obtain conflict free comparison of programs using a relative leakage metric defined by the ratio lim |A|→∞
ILα(C1,|A|)
ILα(C2,|A|) . Evidently, if the relative leakage metric is 0, then program C 2 leaks more information than program C 1 ; if the relative leakage metric is ∞, then program C 1 leaks more information than program C 2 . If the relative leakage metric of programs C 1 and C 2 is a constant c (c = 0, ∞), intuitively one may increase the size of the secret input (namely, log |A|) for program C 1 by a constant factor relative to the size of the secret input for program C 2 to ensure that the programs C 1 and C 2 have equal security level; hence, in this case we conclude that the programs C 1 and C 2 are equal with respect to information leakage. In this section, we formalize this intuition and present a conflict-free approach to comparing information leakage in FOPs.
We first show that for any C = (q |A| , |A|, F |A| , p |A| ), IL α (C, |A|) is closely related to ||p |A| || ∞ .
Lemma IV.1. ∀2 ≤ n ∈ N , for any probability distribution vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , . ..p n ) with ordered sequence
Hα(p)
When 1 < α < ∞, note that ∀p with n ≥ 2,
Thus, equation (6) holds. Next consider (7) .
When α = 1, note that ∀p with n ≥ 2,
and we have
Thus, equation (7) holds. Next consider (8).
When 0 < α < 1, note that ∀p with n ≥ 2,
The other part of (8) can be proved in the same way.
Lemma IV.1 shows that ∀α > 0, lim ||p||∞→1
Hα(p)
Tα(p) is finite. Further, if 2 ≤ n is finite and 1 n ≤ ||p|| ∞ < 1 − for some > 0, both H α (p) and T α (p) will be upper bounded by log n < ∞ and both will be strictly larger than zero. This leads us to Proposition IV.2.
Proposition

IV.2. For any FOP
Proposition IV.2 states that as α is varied, the values of IL α differ among the levels:
Note that these levels are all related to 1 − ||p |A| || ∞ . Intuitively, the rate of convergence of 1 − ||p |A| || ∞ to 0 determines the security level of a program. We formalize this notion in the following proposition:
with q |A| and q |A| both being uniform in A. Applying notation
we have:
Proof: Due to lack of space we prove only the first equation here. The entire proofs can be found in our technical report [14] .
It follows directly from Proposition IV.2 that for any α > 0,
Note that for any intervals T, S ⊂ (0, 1) and any variables t ∈ T, s ∈ S, lim sup t∈T,s∈S
which indicates that
So we conclude that,
The other five equalities can be proved similarly. Now, we are ready to present our solution to compare information leakage of two programs: We claim that algorithm IV.4 (and thus algorithm IV.5) offers a conflict-free solution to comparing information leakage of two programs. The proof follows directly from Proposition IV.3. We note that in algorithm IV.4 that there may be cases wherein two programs are incomparable. However, we claim that it may be impossible to offer a more fine-grained comparison of two programs using Renyi-entropy measure as follows. First, we observe that in Algorithm IV.4, information leakage measures for two are distinguishable if and only if the ratio of their minentropy leakage metric is either 0 = 1/∞ or ∞. The following lemma shows that it is impossible to reduce this ratio to some finite D < ∞: 
We give an intuitive explanation of the proof of Lemma IV.7 here. Recall from Lemma IV.1 that when 0 < α < 1 < β, lim ||p||∞→1
Hα(p)
H β (p) = ∞ for any distribution p with ||p|| ∞ < 1. This allows us to construct a program C 1 with ||p |A| || ∞ close to 1, so that we have
(when |A| is large) and a program C 2 with uniform
(when |A| is large). Clearly, the constructed programs C 1 and C 2 satisfies Lemma IV.7. (see [14] for more details) V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS In this section, we report results obtained by applying our technique to compare information leakage of two programs. We begin by reexamining PROG P4 using our Algorithms. Consider four different parameter values of 
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper we point out important drawbacks in past approaches to information-theoretic measures for quantifying program leakage. We show using examples that some of the metrics proposed by past work may not only be counter-intuitive but also conflict with each other. We have presented a novel conflict-free approach to compare information leakage in two programs and show that it may be impossible to derive a more finegrained comparison using Renyi-entropy based leakage measures. Using several examples we show that the proposed approach vastly outperforms past approaches in matching popular consensus on program information leakage.
